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Content validity, the extent to which a measurement reflects the specific intended 
domain of content, is a basic type of validity for a valid measurement. It has usually 
been examined using qualitative methods and has not been given as much attention as 
the other psychometric properties such as internal consistency reliability, indicator 
reliability and construct validity in the IS field. In this paper, a quantitative approach 
including the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA), and substantive validity 
(CSV) was used to examine content validity for 80 items covering eighth domains 
related to organizational and individual perspectives of information security. The 
content validity for the organizational perspective was examined using data from a 
total of 56 content domain experts. Data from 51 experts were further used to examine 
content validity for the individual perspective of information security. 31 items did 
not have an adequate content validity, leaving the instrument with 49 items that have 
been evaluated for their content validity and can be used in future empirically tests of 
hypotheses in the information security field. To the knowledge of the authors this 
quantitative method to assess content validity of items in the process of developing 








1. Introduction  
The effectiveness and robustness of technical security components has made it more 
difficult to successfully attack an organization’s computer systems using purely 
technical means. Many attackers have therefore started to attack the humans accessing 
and using the computers systems by exploiting human insecure behavior and 
manipulating people into performing actions that benefits the attacker (Applegate, 
2009). This development forces organizations’ to structure and organize their 
information security efforts to ensure that risks related to human aspects of 
information security can be managed effectively throughout the organization. To aid 
and guide managers in selecting and developing effective ways of organizing 
information security efforts, appropriate assessment tools are needed. Several 
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instruments have therefore been developed by researchers to support evaluations of 
information security behavior and understand determinants of such behavior. These 
instruments have usually focused on investigating individual perceptions of external 
cues and properties that determine adherence to information security policies and are 
based on a variety of theories including theory of planned behavior (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010), general deterrence theory (Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004) 
and learning theory (Warkentin, Johnston, & Shropshire, 2011). Other instruments 
have largely focused on measuring success rates of certain types of security attacks, 
(Dodgejr, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007), or capturing characteristics that explain an 
individual’s susceptibility to these attacks (Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, & 
Butavicius, 2012). Instruments to measure the effect of key organizational constructs 
proposed in organizational and individual behavior literature, on information security 
has, however, not been rigorously examined (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012).  
 
This article reports on results towards the development of a measurement instrument 
capturing organizational and individual perspectives of information security needed to 
shape information security behavior. In particular, this article reports on the 
examination of the content validity of a set of items related to these two aspects of 
information security. Content validity “the degree to which items in an instrument 
reflect the content universe to which the instrument will be generalized (Straub, 
Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004, p. 424)”, has usually been examined qualitatively (e.g. 
Brod, Tesler, & Christensen (2009)) and have not be given as much attention as the 
other psychometric properties such as internal consistency reliability, indicator 
reliability and construct validity .  
 
Content validation is an assessment that consists of two stages: development and 
judgment-quantification (Lynn, 2006). The development stage consists of domain 
identification, item generation, and instrument construction (this stage is presented in 
section “Conceptual framework”). Judgment-quantification, entails asking a number 
of experts to evaluate the validity of the items and as a set (DeVellis, 1991).  In the 
present study, the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA), and substantive validity 
(CSV) is used to examine items for their content validity (the method proposed by 
Anderson & Gerbing (1991) is introduced in section “Method”). Besides providing a 
statistical result to assess the adequacy of content validity of each item, the method 
does not make any implicit assumptions about the direction of the relationship 
between the items and their corresponding factors or about the correlations between 
the items themselves. Therefore, it can be used to assess the content validity of either 
formative or reflective indicators (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011). This is 
a fundamental advantage when developing formative items to capture a construct as a 
lack of content validity is a particularly serious problem for constructs with formative 
indicators (Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007).   
 
The investigated items were tested for their content validity by collecting data using 
an email survey distributed to content domain experts. The result of the survey is a set 
of items that have been evaluated for their content validity and can be used for future 
empirically tests of hypotheses in the information security field. This is the main 
contribution of the study.  
 
The rest of the article unfolds as follows. In the next section the conceptual 
foundation for developing the items is presented. Then, the method to assess content 
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validity is discussed together with an outline of the data collection procedure and 
analysis. In the section that follows the results from the content validity study are 
presented and discussed. The last section concludes the article. 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
The conceptual foundation for developing items representing constructs related to 
organizational and individual perspectives of information security was established 
through two studies. These studies follow the recommendations given by MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, & Podsakoff (2011) for developing a measurement instrument. Firstly, 
organizational and individual constructs, that influence information security behavior, 
were identified using an inductive method approach. In a second study, the nature of 
the constructs’ conceptual domain was specified and content domain experts were 
surveyed on the relevance and comprehensiveness of the given construct’s 
dimensions. In the following subsections, the identified constructs are presented. For 
a detailed description of how the constructs were identified the reader is referred to 
Rocha Flores & Ekstedt (2012) and Rocha Flores & Korman (2012). 
 
2.1 Individual perspective 
The identified individual constructs are related to perceptions of organizational 
information security policies, practices, procedures and the social conditions within 
an organizational setting. 46 items were generated based on the conceptual definition 
of each construct. Table 1 depicts the items.  
 
Information Security Leadership (ISL) concerns the information security leader’s 
actions to motivate employees to adopt a security-savvy behavior. The definition of 
the construct is based on the Transformational leadership concept (Bass & Riggio, 
2006). In the context of information security, the concept points out that the leader 
should articulate a security vision so that all employees can easily and clearly 
understand what the aim of information security efforts is in the organization. The 
leader should also show a reasonable level of mastery, and make it clear for each 
employee what role s/he plays in the organization’s information security efforts, what 
his/her responsibilities are and whom to turn to in case of a concern. The information 
security leader’s actions should portray information security efforts as business-
supportively protective and collective and promote understanding and cooperation as 
a means of achieving and maintaining effective information security. The information 
security leader’s actions should finally set expectations, as well as provide contingent 
reward (i.e., punishing non-compliance and negligence while rewarding success 
stories and exemplary behavior). 
 
Information Security Awareness (ISA) concerns an individual’s perception of both 
his/her general knowledge about information security (e.g. value of assets, threat 
exposure given circumstances, vulnerabilities and risks) and his/her cognizance of the 
information security policies in an organization in order to shape employee behavior 
that is conducive to the protection of information assets. The concept is based on the 
definition made by Bulgurcu et al., (2010) and the findings in Rocha Flores & Ekstedt 
(2012).  
 
Learning Oriented Environment (LOE) concerns an individual’s perception of the 
support, possibilities and encouragement of learning within the organizational 
environment. The concept was developed based on Social learning theory (Bandura, 
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1977; Warkentin, Johnston, & Shropshire, 2011). The concept concerns an 
individual’s perception of the availability of support when performing a work task 
(e.g., situational support from colleagues or a superior), an individual’s perception of 
verbal feedback being provided regarding information security while performing 
work tasks etc. (e.g., informal verbal warning, coaching, dialogues or discussions) and 
observation- and imitation-based learning from colleagues, co-motivated through 
seeing a colleague successfully perform a task. 
 
Social Information Security Culture (SISC) concerns an individual’s perception of 
shared beliefs and values among colleagues in the work environment (Chow & Chan, 
2008). The concept further points out the quality (e.g., richness and friendliness) of 
social relationships at the workplace. 
 
2.2 Organizational perspective 
An individual’s perception of information security can be influenced by management 
actions that promote good information security practices through clear direction, and 
provide knowledge of what is necessary for managing information security risks (Von 
Solms & Von Solms, 2006). These actions can be deployed trough security structures, 
processes and transferring mechanisms. 34 items were generated based on the 
conceptual definition of each construct related to organizational perspective of 
information security. Table 2 depicts the items.  
 
Organizational Structure (OS) involve the existence of responsible functions such 
as senior-level information security executives and the establishment of a committee 
comprised of business and security personnel (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010). The 
structure of clear and unambiguous definitions of the roles and responsibilities of the 
involved parties throughout the whole organization are prerequisites for effective 
information security. 
 
Strategic Information Security Processes (SISP) refer to a formal and systematic 
set of activities with the purpose of maintaining an actual picture of assets, threats, 
weaknesses, existing countermeasures and finally risks, with regards to information 
security. Further, the concepts refer to the planning for information security (e.g., 
acquisition of countermeasures, training and education, exercises) and monitoring the 
state of information security, as well as the performance of information security 
efforts and countermeasures (e.g., structures, rules or systems) in the organization. 
 
Security Knowledge Transfer (SKT) refers to the process of capturing and sharing 
knowledge about information security among organizational members through formal 
and informal information flows. The formal activities aims at training employees on 
compliance with actual information security policies in the organization and training 
employees on general information security threats (e.g., threats relevant while 
browsing the Internet, using e-mail for correspondence, or telephone communication). 
The informal activities aim at sharing knowledge and experience regarding 
information security matters (e.g., meetings, seminars or workshops). 
 
Use of IT for Knowledge Transfer (ITKT) refers to the utilization of IT resources 
(e.g., IT solutions and/or devices) in order to aid spreading, sharing and maintenance 





3.1 Rationale for choosing the Anderson and Gerbing method 
Methods for quantitatively measuring content validity include experts rating item 
relevance to the domain of content using a Likert-type rating scale. The proportion of 
experts who are in agreement about item relevance then provides a quantitative 
measure of Content Validity Index (CVI), which has become very popular to use in 
the nursing and health research field. However, the index has been criticized to give 
different results depending on how it’s used (Polit & Beck, 2006).  
 
A promising method to assess the content validity is the method proposed by Hinkin 
& Tracey (1999) as illustrated by Yao, Wu, & Yang (2007) and recommended by 
MacKenzie et al., (2011). The raters are asked to rate the extent to which each item 
(listed in rows) captures each construct (listed at the top of the columns) using a five 
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). However, this 
method has its limitations. The method includes a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA to assess whether an item’s mean rating on one construct differs from its 
ratings on other construct, and because each rater makes multiple ratings for each 
item, it would only be appropriate to use a one-way between-subjects ANOVA to 
analyze the data if the ratings of each item on each construct were provided by 
different raters. This would require substantially more subjects and the test of the item 
rating differences across the constructs (MacKenzie et al., 2011). Further, it is 
important to avoid overburdening the raters, and using one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA would require us to limit the amount of items that we wanted to include in 
the content validity assessment survey. In a study by Yao, Wu, & Yang (2007) the 
Anderson and Gerbing sorting method and Hinkin & Tracey method were compared 
and gave similar results. However, due to the large number of items in our study the 
Anderson and Gerbing sorting method (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991) was chosen to 
decrease the time needed to complete the survey and thus avoid overburdening the 
raters. 
 
3.2 Selection of participants 
When selecting people to serve as raters, it is important to make sure that they have 
sufficient intellectual ability to understand and complete the survey. We therefore 
argue that the raters both need knowledge in the field of information security and 
have sufficient intellectual ability. Consequently we approached content domain 
experts to act as raters. 
 
A thorough selection of experts based on expert criteria is important in order to assure 
reliability and quality of the study (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). The experts were 
identified from scientific articles from searches in professional societies’ databases 
such as the IEEE and in pure indexing databases such as SCOPUS. The search criteria 
involved combinations of topic-words such as “information security”, “information 
security behavior” ”information security governance”, and ”information security 
management” with research area limitations such as ”knowledge sharing” and ”IT 
governance”. The resulting selections of articles were then manually screened, based 
on title and abstract (if sufficient) or full content (if necessary) to determine whether 
the authors should be invited to participate or not. The searches were limited in time 
to the past three years, i.e. only publications from 2008 and onward were selected. In 




3.3 The survey 
As the experts consulted in this study were geographically widely spread, an e-mail 
survey was used. Invitations to respond to an electronic survey were sent in October 
of 2012 to the sample of content domain experts. The survey was hosted by a widely 
used internet-based application (SurveyMonkey) and open for answering during four 
weeks. Two reminders were sent to non-responding participants after a first week and 
a second week in order to increase the response rate (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 
2010). The survey consisted of five pages of which the first provided an introduction 
to the survey, and guidance for completing the survey. The second page included 
questions used to assess background information of respondents. The two following 
pages of the survey consisted of two matrixes (one for the organizational perspective 
containing 34 items and one for the individual perspective containing 46 items) in 
which definitions of the constructs established in Rocha Flores & Korman (2012) 
were listed at the top of the columns and the items, that all were randomly ordered, 
listed in the rows. The experts were asked to read each item and assign it to the 
construct that they, in their judgment, the item best indicate (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1991). 
 
The survey also included questions about the comprehensiveness of the items, i.e. if 
there are any important items missing to capture the construct domain, and the 
understandability of the items, i.e. if the items are constructed improperly and if there 
are any potential misspellings. For each matrix the respondents were asked to give 
qualitative opinions on the given set of items in order to assure that all items related to 
the constructs have been taken into account and are constructed properly. 
 
3.4 Analysis 
From the responses the two indices proportion of substantive agreement (PSA) and 
substantive validity coefficient (CSV) as proposed by Anderson and Gerbing where 
calculated.  
 




Where nc is the number respondents that have assigned the item to the intended 
construct and N is the total number of respondents. The proportion of substantive 
agreement can vary between 0.0 and 1.0. A higher number indicate that more 
respondents have assigned the item to the intended construct. 




Where nc and N is still defined as above and where no is the most assigned constructs 
excluding the intended. The substantive validity coefficient can vary between the 
values -1.0 and 1.0. A positive number indicates that the item is assigned to the 
intended construct more often than any other construct. Analogously a negative value 
indicates that the intended construct is assigned more often to another construct then 
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the intended. There are no criterion values for PSA and CSV. In line with the arguments 
by Yao, Wu, & Yang (2007) on criterion values and due to fact that there are four 
constructs in both the investigated perspectives of information security we used 0.30 
as the threshold value for both PSA and CSV. The expected value for PSA, for instance, 
is 0.25 if an item is randomly assigned. Thus, choosing 0.30 as the criterion value is 
higher than 0.25 and items with either a PSA or CSV below 0.30 were deemed to have 
insufficient content validity.  
 
4. Results and discussions 
Out of a total of 452 e-mail requests that where sent 21 bounced or were unregistered 
from the mailing list. After two reminders 115 had opened the survey and 56 
respondents had completed the survey for the organizational perspective (13%) 
containing and 51 for the individual perspective (11.8%). In the judgment-
quantification process, a minimum of three experts are advised by Lynn (2006), while 
others have recommended from 2 to 20 experts (Gable & Wolf, 1993). In the present 
study, the number of members necessary for a panel greatly exceeds the 
recommended threshold. 
  
4.1 Individual perspective 
Table 1 contains the items and substantive agreement for each construct for each item 
and the substantive validity coefficient for the items posited construct. There were 15 
items that had insufficient content validity (item 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 40, 41, 
42, 43, 44 and 46) with the cut points for PSA and CSV at 0.30 for both values. Five 
items were transferred to SISC as they fulfilled the threshold values for transferring 
items according to Anderson and Gerbing method. One item (item 27) was originally 
in the ISL construct. Four items (item 36, 37, 38 and 39) was originally in the LEO 
construct. The results show that all items representing ISA and SISC had an adequate 
content validity. However, the consensus regarding items representing ISL and LOE 
is rather low. For instance, item 2 (“The way our top management talks and behaves 
makes it clear to me what part I play in achieving and maintaining effective 
information security.”) had a value close to the threshold, but many experts also 
perceived that the item represent ISA. This result is rather confusing due to the fact 
that the item explicitly contains the words “management” and “behaves”. Item 9 
(“Eventual faults and mistakes with a potential to compromise information security 
are looked upon as serious in our organization, yet still as a source of learning rather 
than a reason for punishment”) and item 11 (“Employees in our organization are 
expected to learn from security weaknesses, faults and incidents (own as well as 
others') as to promote excellence.”) should not measure ISL, but rather measure LOE. 
Both items contain the word “learn”, which could have influenced the judgment of the 
experts. Item 41 (“I feel welcome to ask colleagues for advice or help in case of an 
information security concern.”) and 46 (“I have had opportunities to observe people at 
work in order to improve myself with regards to information security.”) were both 
close to the threshold, but were also perceived by the experts to measure SISC and 
could therefore not be regarded as items with a sufficient content validity. The same 
holds for item 42-45.  
 
4.2 Organizational perspective 
Table 2 contains the items and substantive agreement for each construct for each item 
and the substantive validity coefficient for the items posited construct. There were 16 
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items that had insufficient content validity (item 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 25, 27, 31 and 33) with the cut points for PSA and CSV at 0.30 for both values. One 
item (item 7) was originally in the OS construct but the results showed that they 
fulfilled the threshold values for transferring items to SISP.  
 
The remaining results show that low consensus regarding the content validity of items 
could be found in all domains. Differentiating between OS and SISP seems to be 
challenging. For instance, item 5 (“Information security responsibilities are defined 
for each and every employee.”) was generated to measure OS but there were many 
experts that believed the item should measure SISP. Further, item 13 (“At some level 
in the organization, establishment of, changes to and disposal of information security 
controls is being discussed and decided upon.”) and 15 (“Information security 
planning is done regularly, in systematic and formalized ways.”) were both generated 
to measure SISP, but some experts believed that the items should measure OS and 
therefore they both were deemed to have insufficient content validity. 
 
Item 27 (“Employees with dedicated information security responsibilities are striving 
to achieve and maintain friendly relationships to other employees.”) were generated to 
capture the informal security knowledge transfer activities, but the yielded value were 
far from the threshold. In fact, many experts believed the item should measure OS or 
SISP. This gives an indication of the challenges that exists when trying to capture 
concepts that could be interpreted as “vague” and containing “informal” items. 
Item 31 (“There is a system, which provides real-time advice on performed tasks, 
including advice on information security.”) had a value close to the threshold. The 
item was generated to capture ITKT, but the experts perceived that the items also 
could measure SISP. One explanation for not having a value over the threshold could 
be that the item contains a general word “system” and not a specific word such as 
“IT-system”, which could have confused the panel members.  
 
Domain and item N PSA       CSV 
    ISL ISA SISC LOE   
Information Security Leadership 
      
1. Top management in my organization clearly expresses 
what the aim of the information security efforts is in our 
organization is. 
51 0,69 0,20 0,04 0,08 0,49 
2. The way our top management talks and behaves makes 
it clear to me what part I play in achieving and 
maintaining effective information security. 
51 0,51 0,27 0,10 0,12 0,24 
3. The information security leader shows a reasonable level 
of mastery (knowledge and skills) in the field of 
information security. 
51 0,67 0,22 0,04 0,08 0,45 
4. The information security leader portrays information 
security a collective effort. 
51 0,65 0,12 0,18 0,06 0,47 
5. The information security leader promotes shared 
understanding, communication and cooperation as a 
means of achieving and maintaining effective information 
security across the organization. 
51 0,71 0,08 0,16 0,06 0,55 
6. The information security leader portrays information 
security as a supportively protective effort towards 
primary business activities and information values, rather 
than a limiting factor based on formal regulations and 
best practice. 
51 0,63 0,14 0,18 0,06 0,45 
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7. Employees are required to behave in way as to protect 
information values and business activities in our 
organization (also termed due care). 
51 0,31 0,27 0,33 0,08 -0,02 
8. Employees are required to investigate consequences of 
their actions given circumstances as to protect 
information values and business activities in our 
organization (also termed due diligence). 
51 0,27 0,27 0,24 0,22 0,00 
9. Eventual faults and mistakes with a potential to 
compromise information security are looked upon as 
serious in our organization, yet still as a source of 
learning rather than a reason for punishment. 
51 0,16 0,10 0,27 0,47 -0,31 
10. Difficulties to behave in a secure manner towards 
information assets and business activities are followed up 
and actively worked with. 
51 0,20 0,18 0,41 0,22 -0,22 
11. Employees in our organization are expected to learn from 
security weaknesses, faults and incidents (own as well as 
others') as to promote excellence. 
51 0,08 0,18 0,35 0,39 -0,31 
12. Deliberate incompliance or negligence of due care / due 
diligence is being punished (e.g., through personal 
feedback with duty reminder, or a formal disciplinary 
process). 
51 0,35 0,18 0,33 0,14 0,18 
13. Successful steps to incident-prevention or effective 
incident handling are rewarded (e.g., through personal 
feedback and/or benefits). 
51 0,18 0,22 0,31 0,29 -0,14 
14. Successful steps to incident-prevention or effective 
incident handling are made visible as to exemplify and 
encourage such behavior. 
51 0,25 0,22 0,35 0,18 -0,10 
Information Security Awareness 
      
15. I am familiar with the content of our organization's 
information security policy. 
51 0,14 0,71 0,08 0,08 0,57 
16. I know what the information security policy describes as 
acceptable use of e-mail. 
51 0,08 0,69 0,18 0,06 0,51 
17. I know what the information security policy describes as 
acceptable use of Internet and social media. 
51 0,08 0,73 0,10 0,10 0,63 
18. I know what the information security policy describes as 
acceptable use of telephone. 
51 0,06 0,71 0,20 0,04 0,51 
19. I know what the information security policy requires and 
forbids regarding management and use of computer 
passwords. 
51 0,04 0,65 0,22 0,10 0,43 
20. I know how the information security policy regulates work 
with and disposal of sensitive information 
51 0,08 0,69 0,16 0,08 0,53 
21. I know how the information security policy regulates 
disposal and recirculation of devices. 
51 0,10 0,67 0,14 0,10 0,53 
22. I know what the information security policy says about 
installing custom software. 
51 0,12 0,73 0,06 0,10 0,61 
23. Overall, I am aware of potential information security 
threats related to my work and the organization's 
business activities, as well as the negative consequences 
they may cause. 
51 0,06 0,71 0,20 0,04 0,51 
24. I have sufficient knowledge about how much it costs my 
organization to face potential security incidents. 
51 0,06 0,69 0,18 0,08 0,51 
25. I understand concerns regarding information security and 
the risks that information security threats pose in general. 
51 0,08 0,65 0,22 0,06 0,43 
26. In each work situation I am aware of the information 
security issues that can be caused or allowed for through 
my actions as well as eventual negligence. 
51 0,06 0,65 0,14 0,16 0,49 
Social Information Security Culture 
      
27. In our organization, information security is viewed as a 
collective responsibility. 
51 0,20 0,10 0,65 0,06 0,45 
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28. I have good relationships with my colleagues and other 
organizational members. 
51 0,16 0,10 0,67 0,08 0,51 
29. I am close to my colleagues and other organizational 
members with regards to communication, cooperation 
and placement. 
51 0,10 0,24 0,55 0,12 0,31 
30. Colleagues in my department cooperate well with each 
other. 
51 0,12 0,16 0,61 0,12 0,45 
31. Colleagues in my department have a strong feeling of 
together being one team 
51 0,12 0,06 0,69 0,14 0,55 
32. In my department, there is a significant perception of 
having common goals. 
51 0,14 0,14 0,59 0,14 0,45 
33. Both my colleagues and I agree on the fact that 
protection of assets such as information, data and our 
computer environment from getting compromised (e.g., 
unauthorized disclosed, manipulated, infected by viruses 
or malware, or suddenly unavailable) is important. 
51 0,04 0,18 0,61 0,18 0,43 
34. Both my colleagues and I share the same ambitions and 
vision of protecting information assets from being 
compromised in our organization. 
51 0,14 0,18 0,63 0,06 0,45 
35. Both my colleagues and I share and agree on the way 
collective information security goals are being pursued in 
our organization. 
51 0,06 0,25 0,59 0,10 0,33 
36. My colleagues would warn me if they saw me doing 
something (e.g., using computer, or disposing sensitive 
information) in an unsecure way. 
51 0,06 0,16 0,69 0,10 0,53 
37. My colleagues expect me to warn them if I saw them 
doing something in an unsecure way. 
51 0,06 0,20 0,65 0,10 0,45 
38. Providing verbal feedback regarding information security 
between colleagues is generally accepted in my 
organization. 
51 0,06 0,16 0,55 0,24 0,31 
39. When I see my colleagues working and behaving in a 
secure way complying to the information security policies 
and guidelines, it makes me willing to also do so. 
51 0,08 0,16 0,57 0,20 0,37 
Learning Oriented Environment 
      
40. I find that my organization's resources effectively support 
me to prevent my information assets from eventually 
getting compromised (e.g., that some sensitive 
information gets disclosed damaged, or a virus infects my 
computer). 
51 0,16 0,20 0,33 0,31 -0,02 
41. I feel welcome to ask colleagues for advice or help in 
case of an information security concern. 
51 0,08 0,12 0,55 0,25 0,29 
42. I feel welcome to ask my superior or an information 
security responsible person for advice or help in case of 
an information security concern. 
51 0,22 0,24 0,27 0,27 -0,29 
43. Informal communication or discussions regarding 
information security phenomena are welcome among 
colleagues in my organization. 
51 0,06 0,14 0,43 0,37 -0,06 
44. I feel encouraged to learn or improve at a skill when I see 
a colleague mastering it. 
51 0,04 0,22 0,33 0,41 0,08 
45. I have learned to work more secure or improved my 
information security skills through observing my 
colleagues at work and taking example. 
51 0,04 0,16 0,24 0,57 0,33 
46. I have had opportunities to observe people at work in 
order to improve myself with regards to information 
security. 
51 0,10 0,22 0,22 0,47 0,25 
Table 1: Results for the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA) and substantive 





Domain and item N PSA       CSV 
    OS SISP SKT ITKT   
Organizational Structure 
      
1. We have an organizational unit with explicit responsibility for 
organizing and coordinating information security efforts as well as 
handling incidents. 
56 0,70 0,18 0,09 0,04 0,52 
2. There is a committee, comprised of representatives from various 
business units, which coordinates corporate security initiatives 
56 0,64 0,16 0,13 0,07 0,48 
3. There is a committee, which deals with matters of strategic 
information security and related decision making. 
56 0,59 0,27 0,11 0,04 0,32 
4. In our organization, security personnel and line people frequently 
attend cross-functional meetings. 
56 0,27 0,43 0,18 0,13 -0,16 
5. Information security responsibilities are defined for each and 
every employee. 
56 0,48 0,27 0,18 0,07 0,21 
6. Tactical and operative managers are involved in information 
security decision making, which is related to their unit, 
responsibilities and/or subordinates. 
51 0,61 0,18 0,20 0,02 0,41 
Strategic Information Security Process 
      
7. In our organization, security responsibles and representatives 
from various business units meet to discuss important security 
issues both formally and informally. 
56 0,16 0,54 0,16 0,14 0,38 
8. Information about risks across business processes is considered. 56 0,21 0,54 0,11 0,14 0,32 
9. Information about risk on organizational assets is communicated 
from top down. 
56 0,41 0,29 0,14 0,16 -0,13 
10. Vulnerabilities in the information systems and related processes 
are identified regularly. 
56 0,20 0,50 0,20 0,11 0,30 
11. Threats that could harm and adversely affect critical operations 
are identified regularly. 
56 0,11 0,61 0,16 0,13 0,45 
12. Strategic choices and decisions regarding information security, 
such as investments, are being discussed and considered in the 
organization. 
56 0,38 0,54 0,07 0,02 0,16 
13. At some level in the organization, establishment of, changes to 
and disposal of information security controls is being discussed 
and decided upon. 
56 0,32 0,57 0,09 0,02 0,25 
14. Information security operations, audits and/or exercises are 
regularly being planned for in the organization. 
56 0,18 0,46 0,25 0,11 0,21 
15. Information security planning is done regularly, in systematic and 
formalized ways. 
56 0,29 0,57 0,05 0,09 0,29 
16. Breaches, damage to information assets and other information 
security incidents are being reported to a responsible 
organizational unit, person or a dedicated system. 
56 0,39 0,38 0,16 0,07 -0,02 
17. Performance of information security controls is measured, for 
example with regards to the amount of protection they provide as 
well as the obtrusiveness and performance limitations they pose 
to personnel, systems and business activities. 
56 0,20 0,52 0,16 0,13 0,32 
18. In internal interviews or surveys, questions regarding information 
security are being asked. 
56 0,07 0,54 0,25 0,14 0,29 
19. Criteria of information security performance are explicit and clear 
to the responsible personnel. 
56 0,45 0,34 0,18 0,04 -0,11 
Security Knowledge Transfer 
      
20. There is an information policy document and/or information 
security guidelines available to employees. 
56 0,29 0,32 0,30 0,09 -0,02 
21. Employees receive information about information security policy 
and guidelines (such as the acceptable use of e-mail, Internet, 
passwords, telephone, installing additional software etc.). 
56 0,09 0,25 0,39 0,27 0,13 
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22. Formal information security exercises take place in the 
organization (e.g., training of backup procedures or reaction on 
security incidents). 
56 0,07 0,20 0,70 0,04 0,50 
23. In the organization, there is a formal program for information 
security awareness, training and education. 
56 0,11 0,09 0,77 0,04 0,66 
24. Employees receive information about information security threats 
(i.e., which are those, how to avoid falling victim to them and/or 
how to cope with them otherwise). 
56 0,07 0,21 0,54 0,18 0,32 
25. There are informal social arrangements, meetings, seminars or 
workshops directed at sharing experience or knowledge about 
information security, among other. 
56 0,11 0,23 0,46 0,20 0,23 
26. The organization provides informal/voluntary consulting and 
advisory services in information security for its employees. 
56 0,11 0,14 0,54 0,21 0,32 
27. Employees with dedicated information security responsibilities are 
striving to achieve and maintain friendly relationships to other 
employees. 
56 0,36 0,36 0,14 0,14 -0,21 
28. In the organization, there is an atmosphere where learning is 
actively encouraged. 
56 0,21 0,14 0,57 0,07 0,36 
Use of IT for Knowledge Transfer  
      
29. There is an intranet site dedicated to information security (e.g., 
general threats and how tos, policy and guidelines). 
56 0,11 0,14 0,18 0,57 0,39 
30. There is an intranet site, a quality control system or another 
information system or portal, which contains work- and task-
related information security information such as cues, reminders 
or warnings bound to an action, process or a situation. 
56 0,07 0,20 0,14 0,59 0,39 
31. There is a system, which provides real-time advice on performed 
tasks, including advice on information security. 
56 0,13 0,23 0,14 0,50 0,27 
32. Information technology is actively used to share knowledge and 
experience regarding information security within the organization. 
56 0,05 0,14 0,13 0,68 0,54 
33. In our organization, managers are good at using IT to 
communicate security-related information with employees 
56 0,14 0,23 0,16 0,46 0,23 
34. The company saves and renews important knowledge on both 
general information security and threats related to information 
security onto the computer for easy browsing. 
56 0,09 0,16 0,18 0,57 0,39 
Table 2: Results for the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA) and substantive 
validity coefficient (CSV) calculations for the organizational perspective. 
 
4.3 Qualitative comments and item modifications  
No comments were received on wording or potential misspellings of each individual 
item. We explicitly asked for comments to cover this aspect, however, one reason for 
the lack of comments on this aspect could be that the experts perceived the survey to 
be time-consuming. Therefore, the experts chose to conduct the item sorting test and 
leave general comments on the survey and item comprehensiveness, but felt that 
leaving comments on wording and potential misspellings, for 80 individual items, was 
far too demanding.  
 
Most of the general comments were encouraging and experts perceived that that the 
coverage appears comprehensive and well-documented, that the items are relevant 
and that the approach is interesting. Two general comments pertain to the amount of 





“The coverage of the survey is comprehensive. Questions could have been simplified 
a bit as less experienced professionals may have intimidated by the size of question in 
the matrix (…) 
 
Regarding comments on the understandability of specific items, item 27 is critiqued 
by one expert for the vague definition of “friendly relationship”. 
 
“Friendly relationship seemed to be a strange question - if there are employees with 
information security responsibilities, why are not their other tasks discussed.” 
 
Four comments pertain to the conceptualization of the constructs and how they are 
defined. This is problem that needs more attention as argued by MacKenzie et al., 
(2011). Two respondents shared the following related to this issue. 
 
“The categories were vague and many of the items could fit in multiple categories. 
Perhaps some example classifications could be provided to help with understanding 
what the categories mean and how to discriminate between them.” 
 
“The requested exercise is too informal (the categories proposed are somewhat 
unclear and the statements to be classified alike).” 
 
Although the constructs were conceptualized in Rocha Flores & Korman (2012) and 
the items have been categorized accordingly, there are still challenges related to this 
process. The comments provide further evidence on the challenges regarding informal 
constructs that can be perceived to be “vague” such as LOE (where only one out of 
seven items was assessed to have adequate content validity). We therefore highlight 
the importance of a rigorous conceptualization process that clearly and 
unambiguously defines the constructs before generating items that are intended to 
represent the constructs. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of the paper was to examine content validity for 80 items related to 
organizational and individual information security perspectives. The items were 
generated based on a conceptual foundation that was established through two previous 
research studies. The items were tested for their content validity by collecting 
quantitative data from a sample of 56 respondents (organizational perspective) and 51 
for the (individual perspective). 49 out of 80 items were found to have an adequate 
content validity regarding to proportion of substantive agreement (PSA), and 
substantive validity (CSV). As the content validity of items has usually been examined 
qualitatively and have not be given as extensive attention as the other psychometric 
properties such as internal consistency reliability, indicator reliability and construct 
validity, the present paper is novel by demonstrating how to quantitatively examine 
the content validity of generated items in the information security field. 
 
The results shows that the consensus for two domains is high (ISA and SISC). 
Significant differences of how the experts assess the content validity of items were 
identified in the remaining investigated domains. We have further provided our 




The method that was used to assess content validity relies on experts’ judgments. 
However, we would also like to recognize that the finding in the current study may be 
influenced meanings of items from experts’ viewpoints rather than survey 
respondents’ perspective. Future studies could take this into consideration when 
assessing content validity using quantitative methods. 
 
In the next phase of the research, empirical data will be collected using the key 
informant methodology in which respondents will be chosen based on their position, 
experience and professional knowledge. After conducting pilot tests, empirical data 
will be collected from two key-informants per organization – one respondent from the 
security organization, and one with a role that includes regular utilization of 
information technology products and services, e.g. computers, Internet access, 
electronic mail, etc. (at least ten respondents per organization). To be able to identify 
differences based on observed heterogeneity, data will be collected from a population 
with varying characteristics (age, gender, experience etc.) and from organizations 
covering a comprehensive range of industries in Scandinavia. 
 
References 
Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1991). Predicting the performance of measures in 
a confirmatory factor analysis with a pretest assessment of their substantive 
validities. Journal of Applied Psychology, 76(5), 732–740. 
Applegate, S. D. (2009). Social Engineering: Hacking the Wetware! Information 
Security Journal: A Global Perspective, 18(1), 40–46. 
Bandura, A. (1977). Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: : Prentice Hall. 
Bass, B. M., & Riggio, R. E. (2006). Transformational Leadership (2nd ed.). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Blaxter, L., Hughes, C., & Tight, M. (2010). How to Research. McGraw-Hill 
International. 
Brod, M., Tesler, L. E., & Christensen, T. L. (2009). Qualitative research and content 
validity: developing best practices based on science and experience. Quality of 
life research : an international journal of quality of life aspects of treatment, care 
and rehabilitation, 18(9), 1263–1278. 
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010). Information Security Policy 
Compliance: An Empirical Study of Rationality-Based Beliefs and Information 
Security Awareness. Management Information Systems Quarterly, 34(3), 523 – 
548. 
Chow, W. S., & Chan, L. S. (2008). Social network, social trust and shared goals in 
organizational knowledge sharing. Information & Management, 45(7), 458–465. 
DeVellis, R. F. (1991). Scale development: Theory and applications. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Dodgejr, R., Carver, C., & Ferguson, A. (2007). Phishing for user security awareness. 
Computers & Security, 26(1), 73–80. 
Gable, R. K., & Wolf, J. W. (1993). Instrument development in the affective domain: 
Measuring attitudes and values in corporate and school settings. Boston: Kluwer 
Academic. 
Hu, Q., Dinev, T., Hart, P., & Cooke, D. (2012). Managing Employee Compliance 
with Information Security Policies: The Critical Role of Top Management and 
Organizational Culture. Decision Sciences, 43(4), 615–660. 
15 
 
Kayworth, T., & Whitten, D. (2010). Effective Information Security Requires a 
Balance of Social and Technology Factors. MIS Quartely Executive, 9(3), 303–
315. 
Lee, S. M., Lee, S.-G., & Yoo, S. (2004). An integrative model of computer abuse 
based on social control and general deterrence theories. Information & 
Management, 41(6), 707–718. 
Lynn, M. R. (2006). Determination and Quantification Of Content Validity. Nursing 
Research, 35(6), 382–386. Retrieved from 
http://journals.lww.com/nursingresearchonline/Citation/1986/11000/Determinatio
n_and_Quantification_Of_Content.17.aspx 
MacKenzie, S. B., Podsakoff, P. M., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2011). Construct 
measurement and validation procedures in MIS and behavioral research: 
integrating new and existing techniques. MIS Quarterly, 35(2), 293–334. 
Pattinson, M. R., Jerram, C., Parsons, K., McCormac, A., & Butavicius, M. (2012). 
Why Do Some People Manage Phishing Emails Better Than Others? Information 
Management & Computer Security, 20(1), 18–28. 
Petter, S., Straub, D., & Rai, A. (2007). Specifying formative constructs in 
information systems research. MIS Quarterly, 31(4), 623–656. 
Polit, D. F., & Beck, C. T. (2006). The content validity index: are you sure you know 
what’s being reported? Critique and recommendations. Research in nursing & 
health, 29(5), 489–97. 
Rocha Flores, W., & Ekstedt, M. (2012). A Model for Investigation Organizational 
Impact on Information Security Behavior. Seventh Annual Workshop on 
Information Security and Privacy (WISP) 2012. 
Rocha Flores, W., & Korman, M. (2012). Conceptualization of Constructs for 
Shaping Information Security Behavior: Towards a Measurement Instrument. 
Seventh Annual Workshop on Information Security and Privacy (WISP) 2012. 
Straub, D., Boudreau, M.-C., & Gefen, D. (2004). Validation Guidelines for IS 
Positivist Research. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 
13(1), 380–427. 
Warkentin, M., Johnston, A. C., & Shropshire, J. (2011). The influence of the 
informal social learning environment on information privacy policy compliance 
efficacy and intention. European Journal of Information Systems, 20(3), 267–
284. 
Weiss, D. J., & Shanteau, J. (2003). Empirical Assessment of Expertise. Human 
Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 45(1), 104–
116. 
Von Solms, R., & Von Solms, B. (2006). Information Security Governance: A model 
based on the Direct–Control Cycle. Computers & Security, 25(6), 408–412. 
Yao, G., Wu, C., & Yang, C. (2007). Examining the content validity of the 
WHOQOL-BREF from respondents’ perspective by quantitative methods. Social 
Indicators Research, 85(3), 483–498. 
 
